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T he Program on Alternative Investments, under the aegis of the Center on JapaneseEconomy and Business and in cooperation with the Center for Japanese Legal Studies and
the Japan Business Association of Columbia University, presented “Restructuring Distressed
Companies in Japan” on November 20, 2003. The symposium featured Richard A. Gitlin,
Chairman of Gitlin & Company; and William Seidman, Chief Commentator of CNBC and 
former Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC) as well as former
Chairman of the Resolution Trust Company (RTC). Commenting were Curtis Milhaupt, Fuyo
Professor of Law at Columbia School of Law, who also serves as Director of the Center for
Japanese Legal Studies; and Robert Fallon, currently a professional fellow at the Center on
Japanese Economy and Business. Professor Hugh Patrick, Director of the Center on Japanese
Economy and Business, moderated the discussion. Mr. Gitlin began with an analysis of the sys-
temic structure, policies, and reservoir of political will necessary for successfully restructuring
distressed companies in Japan. He discussed the three factors in light of recent developments,
arguing there is reason to be more optimistic about the process of corporate restructuring in
the near future. Other panelists were more cautiously optimistic, agreeing that there had been
a number of favorable changes in Japan’s institutions and policies of corporate restructuring. 
Mr. Seidman enumerated several stumbling blocks, linking current institutional problems to
those that confronted prior reforms. Curtis Milhaupt cautioned that microeconomic factors
affecting restructuring are not as favorable as the new institutional framework for restructuring.
Mr. Fallon recounted his own experience in restructuring as a practitioner with an American
financial concern working in Japan. Excerpts of the discussion are presented in this report,
together with portions of the ensuing Q & A period.  
every time a big case was filed, 
an independent trustee had to be
appointed. Sometimes that is not the
best thing. Sometimes you want to
keep the management, particularly if
they were not at fault. They modified
that now, so they can appoint the
management as trustee—a very 
significant development. 
In Japan, there are very reliable
courts, good judges, and a good
group of professionals, albeit too
small a group of professionals.
Fundamentally, however, they do 
not use the system well yet because
they started too late. By the time they
start, most of the value is squeezed
out of the companies. However,
there is now a system in place in
Japan that can support corporate
restructuring and support it quite
well. 
The second factor is the Financial
Supervisory Agency. The FSA, which
is the bank regulatory body, has
tightened its approach to banks.
Over the years, all of us have been
very frustrated that the FSA has not
been as hard as we would like in its
inspections and its demands to see
that the banks wrote down their non-
performing loans (NPLs) to an appro-
priate value and set strategies to
make profits. This last year, the FSA
issued an order that the banks have
to reduce their NPLs by 50 percent
by 2005. I met with some of the
banks recently. They are taking that
quite seriously. The FSA has also
issued an order to the 15 banks that
got funds from the government that
says, “First, you have to tell us what
profits you’re going to make and we
must pass judgment on that plan, and
if you don’t make those profits, we’re
going to change your top manage-
ment.” Recently, they asked the
banks to provide more detailed 
information on their deferred tax
asset, which is an asset that all of 
us question as support for capital 
in the banks in Japan, an act that
clearly sets the target of putting 
much more pressure on the banks 
on that particular issue.
I had been told by the FSA that they
were going to tighten their special
inspections about six weeks ago.
They just announced the results of
the last special inspection. They
looked at 161 companies—24 were
downgraded from the position they
were in six months before. The FSA
did what it said it was going to do. 
The third factor is the IRCJ (Industrial
Rehabilitation Corporation of Japan),
which has US$83 billion to buy
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Prospects and Problems of
Restructuring
RICHARD GITL IN
Chairman of Gitlin & Company
What signs should you look for to
make a determination that a country
is ready to fix its banks and corpora-
tions that are in trouble? I have found
that it happens in a country when three
things converge. The first is the law.
The fundamental question is, is there
a system in place adequate to support
restructuring? The second is policy:
are there policies in place that unify
the actions of the bureaucracy, that the
bureaucracy can understand and make
clear what they are trying to achieve?
The third, and probably the most
important, is political will. It does not
matter if there are policies and it does
not matter if the system is in place. If
there is no political will in a country
to make it happen, it does not happen.
I believe those three components
have come together in Japan, not
perfectly, but enough to ignite the
process of corporate restructuring in
Japan, and I would like to tell you
why.
There are eight factors. The first is
the legal infrastructure. Japan has 
put in place one of the best legal
infrastructures in the world to sup-
port corporate restructuring. The 
law they put in place for corporate
rehabilitation in April 2003 (the Civil
Rehabilitation Law) is modeled after
our Chapter 11, but it is designed 
for Japan. It is practical and it works.
Thousands of cases have been 
conducted under that law since it
was adopted. The Corporate Reorg-
anization Law was also modified.
That is a law for big cases, and what
happened in the old days was that





It does not matter if there are policies and it does not matter if
the system is in place. If there is no political will in a country
to make it happen, it does not happen.                  —Richard Gitlin
Japan has mustered the political 
will to begin the process of corporate
and bank restructuring. Before the
recent election, Prime Minister
Koizumi was selected to lead the
party. Significantly, he reappointed
Minister Takenaka and there was a
lot of political negotiation to try to
stop that from happening. What 
was significant in this election was
that the LDP (Liberal Democratic
Party) did not win control. Without 
a coalition, it would be harder 
for Koizumi to pursue the reforms
necessary for corporate restructuring.
If the LDP were the sole power, 
the elders of the party would have 
a little more leverage, but when
Koizumi has to answer to a third
party, he has the power now to look
to the elders and say, “If I don’t
demonstrate reform, we’re going to
lose ground.” Anything that gives
Koizumi and Takenaka more political
power is a positive thing for reform
in Japan. 
I thought that one sentence from
Governor Fukui’s October 1 speech
was quite telling. He said, “It’s vital
for management of both the compa-
nies and banks to become aware of
the urgency of corporate revitaliza-
tion through effective dialogue and
adequate speed and decisiveness.”
The Governor is doing his best to set
some insight and direction regarding
what should happen in this area. 
Finally, the language has changed 
in Japan. If you go to Japan now 
and talk to people about corporate
restructuring, people are going to
talk to you about prepackaged deals.
A year ago, no one talked about
prepackaged deals. People are going
to talk to you about the study on 
DIP (debtor-in-possession) financing:
How do we get financing earlier?
People are going to talk to you about
fixing viable companies. No one
talked about fixing viable companies
twelve months ago. Everybody in
Japan has become a turnaround man-
agement expert. A year ago, no one
knew the name. Now, they believe
more and more resources are going
to be devoted to actually fixing busi-
nesses in Japan, creating a serious
demand for talent to help. 
I do not believe there has been a
radical change in Japan, where there
was no restructuring yesterday and
there will be huge restructuring
tomorrow. Still, I do believe we are
no longer talking about the direction,
but the pace of change. My guess is
the next twelve months will see a
very significant acceleration.
WILLIAM SEIDMAN
Chief Commentator of CNBC-TV,
Former Chairman of the FDIC,
Former Chairman of the RTC
I have made a little list of all the 
reasons that were given to me by 
the government, by the banks, and
so forth, explaining why the kind of
restructuring that Richard and I pro-
posed, based on the American expe-
rience, would not happen in Japan. 
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minority bank debt and help fix
viable companies. In the first four
cases of the IRCJ, they did valuations
that caused many banks to signifi-
cantly write down the value of their
debt over and above their reserve
value. There was good news and bad
news. The good news is it is the first
time an independent government
agency has done a valuation in com-
parison to what the banks had been
doing in valuation. The bad news for
the IRCJ is that they need the banks
to come to them voluntarily for cases
and that action really dried up the
supply. Still, it is very significant to
have independent valuation from the
IRCJ on the discounted future cash
flow method as a means of compari-
son to looking at the banks’ reserve
policies. 
Fourth, the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI) is focusing
rather intently on each overcapacity
industry in Japan to make a determi-
nation as to what they can do to fix
the problem. 
Furthermore, METI has taken a 
very proactive position on corporate
restructuring. They were the ones
who funded our turnaround manage-
ment programs. When Laura Resnikoff
of Columbia went to Japan to give 
a talk, it was METI who provided 
the funds for her to go. They are 
trying to be a driving force for 
corporate restructuring in Japan. 
Fifth, foreign strategic and international
investors have focused on Japan. 
If you watch the Resona situation,
when the government came in and
put money in Resona Bank, the stock
market went up in value. I believe
the value increases of the banks and
the banking system, as a result of the
stock market increase, far exceeded
the amount of money the govern-
ment put in to fix Resona. 
You can argue whether or not you
should leave stockholders in place
when you put that amount of money
in place, but regardless, a strong
message was received. There is a 
disproportionate appetite out there
among investors looking for the right
signs in Japan. There are strategic
investors whom I talk to frequently
who are global players and they can-
not seem to get their hands on the
appropriate assets in Japan. There are
fund investors, and many are under-
weighted in Japan. They want to
change that, so they are looking for
signals. Japan has a real asset in the
disproportionate interest of the for-
eign investment community to invest
in Japan. Hopefully, they can harness
that very wisely.
The sixth factor is Governor Fukui of
the Bank of Japan, who is an advo-
cate of corporate restructuring. His
mission in life is monetary policy, 
but he is an advocate of corporate
restructuring, and that makes a big
difference because the Bank of Japan
is both a thought leader and an
action leader on items that deal with
this topic. Well before he knew he
would be governor, he was abun-
dantly curious how corporate restruc-
turing would fit with monetary and
fiscal policy, how it fit in the fix of
Japan, and he was willing to devote
time to understand this.
Seventh, Minister Takenaka of the
FSA said something six weeks ago 
in a policy statement that was very
significant in terms of his thinking
regarding the banks. He said, “We
want the banks to really fix compa-
nies. We don’t want any more tem-
porary fixes.” That is very significant
because a year ago, if you asked
someone in Japan, “What is restruc-
turing?” they would tell you,
“Reducing the debt of a company.”
That was basically the accepted 
definition of restructuring in Japan.
That does not fix a company. You 
fix a company by fixing the business,
and then you adjust the balance
sheet to fix the business strategy. 
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I do believe we are no longer talking about the direction, but the 
pace of change.                                                          —Richard Gitlin
Richard Gitlin
Now, we have the restructuring
organization with funding, with a
very good, strong staff that could
restructure many things, but they
have not been able to get a single
asset from the banks out of the 
original ones that were ordered out. 
I said, “What’s the problem with fair
market value? Hire a couple of peo-
ple; have them determine what fair
market value is.” The banks will not
do that. What is the real problem?
The restructuring organization thinks
the fair market value is far lower
than the banks think it is, even after
they have done all this writing down.
As a result, the banks do not want to
transfer to this organization. The bor-
rowers do not want to get into the
hands of a really ruthless “American-
style” restructurer. 
So, nothing has happened. That does
not mean things will not happen, but
I look at the RCC, which essentially
did nothing for five years because of
this problem, and then I go to this
new organization that is really
equipped, and the same problem is
in effect. I then suggested to them,
“Why don’t you have a new way to
do this? Create a joint venture with
these banks. Put these assets in; 
you won’t have to write them down
then.” The problem is the banks are
still dicey on capital. The accounting
rules could be made such that you
do not have to take any losses until
the final liquidation of your invest-
ment; then the banks will take the
losses, but by then the banks will
presumably be okay. 
That may be a bad idea, but it
addresses a problem that has 
been part of this whole restructuring
issue since we first looked at it. 
Will that change? Keep an eye on 
the IRCJ. When you see the banks
transferring assets to that agency, 
you will know that things are starting
to move. Until then, be cautious
about being too optimistic about
what has happened. 
Richard is right; the environment is
changing. Still, while Fukui is a little
better than his predecessor, this 
predecessor was totally in favor of
restructuring.. The problem that
Takenaka has is that when Koizumi
listed the priorities for his new regime,
he no longer even listed the bad debts
in the banks as one of the top three
priorities. Yet, Koizumi is a brilliant
politician. I wrote a piece six months
ago that said he is doing better than
you think, because in each of the
key areas that he has lined up, he
has made some progress, but he has
not pushed hard enough to commit
suicide the way Hashimoto did, when
he really went in and tore things up. 
We will make progress in the banks.
However, although it will be better
than perhaps it was last year, it is 
still going to be a very, very long-
term process. I am more optimistic
than in the past, but I do not think
you are going to see any huge
change until somebody decides what
fair market value means. Then you
will begin to see a very rapid
increase in the restructuring. 
CURTIS MILHAUPT
Fuyo Professor of Law; Director,
Center for Japanese Legal Studies,
Columbia School of Law
Richard set up my comment wonder-
fully when he said that the new legal
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The first is that the economy is too
weak: You had a strong economy;
we have a weak economy. 
Second: You had an infrastructure for
doing these things; we do not. 
Third: Our banks are much weaker
than your banks were. 
Fourth: There is a cultural bar against
treating people the way you have
treated them in the United States. 
In other words: We are not going 
to treat people the way you have
treated them in the United States,
throwing thousands out of work 
and all the other nasty things you
have to do. 
Fifth: We are in political gridlock.
Koizumi has to have a coalition 
and his own party does not really
approve of most of what he is doing. 
Sixth: We have weak regulators who
simply are not used to taking the
kind of regulatory actions that you
took, and we have a real fear of for-
eign ownership. We do not want to
do this so that Japan ends up with
major foreign ownership, particularly
of the banks. We also have a great
fear that if we really restructure,
somebody will make a lot of money,
and we do not want anyone to make
a lot of money. We do not want to
have what happened to your coun-
try, where several people made real
fortunes and our legal system is not
equipped to handle the problems. 
I heard Richard’s speech before when
he was in Japan and was tremen-
dously encouraged and I still am
encouraged. Still, let me give you a
little of my experience after I heard
his speech. 
If you talk to the people who are
running the Resolution and Collection
Corporation (RCC), they are terribly
discouraged. They do not have any-
thing to do; nobody is giving them
any property. The reason is that the
banks and the RCC could not agree.
Under the law, the banks are sup-
posed to sell assets to them at fair
market value. Not surprisingly, they
could not agree on fair market value,
and so they never got any assets
except short-term loans to business,
particularly small business. They
were not giving them enough
money, and they were telling them
they would have to change. At the
same time, the bank was saying, 
“We only want to give people money
who will pay us back.” The regula-
tors told them, “That is not your first
obligation. Your first obligation is 
to take care of people who are in
trouble.” 
After I heard Richard’s speech, I was
delighted. I thought I could go back
and all of these problems I listed
would have disappeared. I went to
the IRCJ and they said, “We don’t
have any assets to work with. We
were given four [companies] to begin
with and there hasn’t been another
since. We can’t agree with the banks
on fair market value. The banks are 
supposed to transfer these assets 
to the restructuring organization at 
fair market value.” 
Where did I hear that before? At the
RCC for five or six years and they
never did agree. I gave a speech 
to the Diet in which I said, “Unless
you find some way to break this
deadlock over fair market value,
nothing is going to happen. I gave
that speech two or three years ago. 
Unfortunately, I was right and noth-
ing happened.
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Keep an eye on the IRCJ.
When you see the banks
transferring assets to that
agency, you will know that
things are starting to move.
—William Seidman
I am more optimistic than
in the past, but I do not
think you are going to see
any huge change until
somebody decides what fair
market value means. Then
you will begin to see a very
rapid increase in the
restructuring.
—William Seidman
and the IRCJ has only handled about
half a dozen cases so far. Why are
firms not making use of this great,
new regime? 
Maybe there are too many options
now. If you parse through this
regime, there are conflicting incen-
tives for firms. Why use the Civil
Rehabilitation Law if you can use the
METI-sponsored Industrial Revitalization
Act and get tax credits and other
benefits from the government with-
out the stigma of entering a formal
legal procedure? 
It is interesting to note that all this
reform has been piecemeal, one
statute at a time, as opposed to a
comprehensive overhaul creating a
unified regime. I still do not under-
stand the IRCJ’s reason for being.
Why couldn’t the market do every-
thing that the IRCJ is doing? If the
market cannot find fair market value
for firms, what can a government
agency add? Some Japanese scholars
and observers have suggested that
what we are seeing is a reappearance
of the planned industrial reorganiza-
tion one saw in the 1970s in Japan.
That was another time when you saw
the sprouting of a mushroom-like
growth of depressed industry statutes,
special cartels, and government-directed
revitalization schemes that probably
did not make much economic sense
but may have made political sense. 
I throw that out for comment. Are we
witnessing a kind of reemergence of
industrial policy where the bureau-
crats control everything? How healthy
are the rehabilitated firms? 
Other categories of reasons why
more firms might not be entering the
new rehabilitation regime are culture,
politics, and economics. I want to
focus on a latent theme in the discus-
sion, which is that perhaps it is too
late to revitalize many firms in Japan.
All of these regimes presume going
concern value on the part of firms.
Maybe there is no going concern
value left. They have entered the
process too late; they have failed
business plans, and so there is noth-
ing to be preserved. These assets
need to be liquidated or sold off. 
You might retort that one thing
Japanese firms have in spades are
valuable relationships and that these
deserve to be preserved. I agree that
replacing these relationships would
be costly, but if they are attached 
to a failed business plan, they have
no going concern value. Ultimately, 
a firm with a failed business model
must face its day of reckoning.
Across large sectors of the Japanese
economy—retail, construction, etc.—
one does not see a lot of going con-
cern value that can be preserved.
It is interesting to contrast Chapter 11
practice in the United States today. A
recent study by some very prominent
bankruptcy scholars in the United
States suggests that in the United
States, Chapter 11 is not used to 
preserve going concern value in 
the way that we used to think of it. 
It is a place where firms are put on
the auction block. Assets are taken
offline, managers lose their jobs,
plants are sent overseas, etc. 
My sense is that Japanese do not
have that image of corporate restruc-
turing. They see it as a place where
creditors get together, everyone takes
a little haircut, and the firm is turned
back out into the world, even if it
lacks a viable business model.
My hypothesis is that while the
reforms have been excellent, they
offer meaningful options to a very
small percentage of currently trou-
bled firms. What is really needed 
is a change in creditor mentality. 
You need better exit options in
Japan, more liquid markets for assets
and human capital. Zombies do not
need to be brought back to life; they
have to be dismembered. We will not
see real changes in Japan until that
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regime in Japan is excellent, but
firms come into the process too late,
by which time most of the value has
been squeezed out of the company. 
I want to begin by stepping back and
explaining how the prior legal system
contributed to that problem. 
First are poor contracting practices.
Japanese lenders have tended to lend
on the basis of collateral, namely real
estate, and have not looked to the
underlying cash flow or the business
model of the firm in making loans.
Contracting practices reinforce this. 
Japanese credit documentation is
very slim, very rudimentary. One
does not find financial covenants
even of the most basic sort in these
documents, yet these covenants 
serve as a device for alerting credi-
tors that problems may be starting
with a borrower. Without those,
lenders are forced to fall back on
collateral. Notes and IOUs have been
very prevalent in trade financing in
Japan; personal guarantees have
been overused. Again, if you do 
not have sophisticated contractual
mechanisms to give assurances to 
a creditor that they are going to 
be paid back, they will seek other
forms of assurance—forms that are
blunter in terms of alerting creditors
to potential problems. 
Second, prior to the reforms discussed
by Richard Gitlin, Japan had a very
complex, opaque, and inefficient
bankruptcy regime and virtually no
experts in that regime. This com-
pounded the hesitancy to make 
use of this framework. 
As Richard told you, there has been
massive reform in this area, and
Japan now has one of the most
extensive and best formal bankruptcy
regimes in the world. Richard has
discussed the Civil Rehabilitation
Law, which to my mind is one of the
more important pieces of this new
restructuring regime. There have 
also been changes in the corporate
reorganization law and the creation
of a host of other options, including
the IRCJ that Bill has talked about,
principles for out-of-court workouts
and special bankruptcy regimes for
banks and other institutions. There 
is now a large menu of very good
options for troubled firms in Japan. 
Not surprisingly, the new regime has
drawn a lot of praise. One scholar
compared the amount of time it takes
firms to go through the civil rehabili-
tation process in Japan today versus
Chapter 11 in the United States in the
1980s, a time of financial difficulty
for U.S. firms. He finds that firms 
are emerging in Japan faster than
American firms were emerging in 
the 1980s and concludes that Japan
has a quite effective legal system.
For me, this raises a question. If the
new system is so good, why are not
more firms using it? Civil rehabilita-
tion law filings are still only about 
5 percent of total bankruptcy filings.
Out-of-court workouts have been
used only about a dozen times, 
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My hypothesis is that while the reforms have been excellent, they offer mean-
ingful options to a very small percentage of currently troubled firms.  
—Curtis Milhaupt
Curtis Milhaupt
cial information to determine a valua-
tion for Chinon’s assets. What we 
discovered, not unsurprisingly, was
that Chinon had negative cash flow.
This would lead the price negotiation
toward a purchase of assets, but
Hachijuni insisted, “Chinon must
remain a public company.” 
So, we faced several problems: (1)
Hachijuni wanted to keep Chinon as
a public company. (This was impor-
tant for face reasons.) (2) Chinon had
negative cash flow. (This caused
Kodak not to want the manufacturing
business, only the camera design and
lens business.) (3) As a result of
Kodak’s desire not to acquire the
manufacturing assets of Chinon, the
company would inevitably need to
lay off manufacturing workers or find
other uses for their production skills.
(This was a nettlesome issue for Chinon
and Hachijuni.) (4) Hachijuni Bank
would need to take a haircut on its
Chinon debt to make the transaction
work. (This would further deplete
the bank’s already thin capital.)
With these obstacles, we left this 
particular series of meetings feeling
that a Chinon deal was unlikely. But,
as happens in Japan, sometimes you
have to let things percolate slowly.
Kodak was patient and we went
through a protracted negotiation 
that lasted almost two years. It was
tedious and complex. There were
multiple issues to deal with, such 
as maintaining the listing on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange, but we 
persevered.
The upshot of these innumerable
negotiations was the realization by
Hachijuni Bank that there was no
other way out of the box. Chinon
was not coming back to financial
health and the bank’s only alternative
to realize some value for its non-
performing loans was to engineer a
sale of whatever Chinon assets they
could to Kodak. Though Chinon
principals attended the key negotia-
tions, their role was more form than
substance. The Hachijuni bankers
made the key decisions. The Chinon
executives were always scrupulously
consulted but invariably agreed with
the bank’s decision.
Ultimately, the four major obstacles
were addressed. Chinon was split
into two parts, but before we did
that, we went to the Tokyo Stock
Exchange and applied to do a reverse
split. This is where you shrink the
number of shares outstanding, which
theoretically increases the price, but
we also applied to the Tokyo Stock
Exchange to reduce the par value. In
effect, we wiped out a great majority
of the shareholder book value in
order to align the market and book
values. This was important if Kodak
was to take control of Chinon and
maintain the public listing. It came as
no surprise that Hachijuni was one of
the major shareholders who took a
significant haircut on their equity
holding. The bank also agreed to
write off a substantial portion of its
Chinon debt as a precondition for
Kodak to tender for Chinon shares. 
Simultaneous with the tender offer
and Kodak taking control of the 
company, the board voted to split 
Chinon into old Chinon and new
Chinon. New Chinon assumed the
manufacturing assets and with that,
the majority of the people. New
Chinon was a private company
essentially controlled by Hachijuni
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pain is dispensed. This rehabilitation
regime is a good start, but it does not
take us all the way. 
ROBERT FALLON 
Professional Fellow, Center on
Japanese Economy and Business
I was with Chase Manhattan Bank in
Tokyo, and Chase had a very big
business in Japan, particularly with
financial institutions. One of the
regional banks in Nagano prefecture,
Hachijuni Bank, was a main client
who had asked for some advice
about securitization because the bank
had some NPL problems to address.
We brought them down from Nagano
to Tokyo and had them sit through a
day of technical discussion on securi-
tization, only to realize that they had
some real problems in terms of their
NPL portfolio. One particular prob-
lem credit was a Nagano-based man-
ufacturer of lenses, optical devices,
and cameras called Chinon Industries.
Chinon was a public company in
Japan trading on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. The company was well
known for its lens technology and
had a reasonable brand name in
cameras. But despite its technology,
the company was a victim of brutal
competition from other Japanese
camera manufacturers, such as
Canon, Nikon, and Olympus. Chinon
had beautiful facilities out in Nagano
prefecture and competent assembly
lines making cameras. They just did
not make any money. 
We tried to get Hachijuni to see it
needed to take some drastic action to
remedy the NPL problem of Chinon
Industries. Like other Japanese banks
confronting troubled credits, they had
kept advancing money, in order to
keep Chinon solvent. But this tactic,
keeping a borrower alive, is really
not in the best interest of any bank,
for it depletes the bank’s capital and
prolongs resolution of the NPL in
question. 
Hachijuni understood the message
but did not really want to react to it. 
Fast forward nine months later. I was
having lunch with the international
treasurer of Kodak. We were good
friends and he, at that time in 1997,
was saying, “We at Kodak are worried
about the advent of digital photography
because ultimately it will cannibalize
the sales of film and we’re a film
company, not a camera company.
This is where we have to become
more competitive.” I said, “Funny you
should say that. I know a bank in
Japan with a client, a Japanese camera
company, that is failing. Kodak might
consider an acquisition.” He said,
“That’s not a bad idea.” 
Ultimately I made a trip up to Nagano
and met with Hachijuni to present
Chase’s idea that a major U.S. company
might be interested in buying Chinon
Industries. We were encouraged to
talk further. I knew we had a legiti-
mate opportunity, so we negotiated
an M&A mandate with Kodak to 
represent them in the possible acqui-
sition of Chinon Industries.
Armed with this mandate, a Chase
team went back to Hachijuni to 
outline an acquisition proposal and
ask for an introduction to Chinon.
The Hachijuni principals responded,
“You can negotiate with us. Later on,
you can talk to Chinon.” 
This is not unusual in Japan, where
the main bank exercises tremendous
influence over its corporate client.
We understood that reality and dealt
only with Hachijuni, reviewing finan-
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Restructuring in Japan does
happen, but one must be 
prepared to deal with issues
that do not necessarily arise
in the United States. Issues 
of face, decision-making,
and timing can take on a
different hue in Japan.
—Robert Fallon
There is a tendency in restruc-
turing for denial. People find
it hard to accept the reality
of difficult decisions. This is
not uniquely Japnese; it is a
human trait. But in Japan,
denial can persist beyond a
reasonable period.
—Robert Fallon
going to find yourself having to 
renegotiate later on. 
Lastly, there is a tendency in restruc-
turing for denial. People find it hard
to accept the reality of difficult deci-
sions. This is not uniquely Japanese;
it is a human trait. But in Japan,
denial can persist beyond a reason-
able period. The process of working
through denial in Japan is more com-
plex and protracted because of cul-
tural issues. Economic decisions may
be frustrated because other issues of
face or obligation become paramount.
Corporate restructuring in Japan 
has been done in the past and will
continue in the future. But, as our
experience with Chinon illustrated, 
it is a custom, not cookie-cutter, busi-
ness that requires cultural familiarity,
patience, and credibility with the
main bank. 
Discussion
Richard Gitlin: When the govern-
ment put funds in Resona, an inde-
pendent auditor was hired to look
over Resona’s NPLs, and we were 
all debating whether that would
come back with a hard value or a
soft value. We concluded that if it
came back with a hard value, that
was a very optimistic sign. They did
come back with a hard value that
reduced the capital of the bank from
a 12 percent coverage to a 6 percent
coverage, causing significant criticism
of the Koizumi government about
making the investment in the first
place. The second thing that Resona
did that is very significant is they
issued a business plan that is almost
like an independent bank business
plan to reduce their cost and increase
their profit. These two moves were a
reflection of independence. Not to be
overemphasized, these were stakes in
the ground that are significant from a
directional point of view.
The IRCJ, as Curtis mentioned, has
available these INSOL Principles.
They are global principles for work-
outs, common sense principles. The
banks get together, the banks elect a
chair, they negotiate, they find out
the right deal, they make a deal, and
they share equally. There is nothing
complicated about these out-of-court
principles, but Japan’s banks do not
follow them. Japan adopted the
INSOL Principles, but with certain
amendments. Japan’s banks do not
share the loss equally. It is one of
the fundamental problems of restruc-
turing in Japan. The main banks have
often taken responsibility for man-
agement, including putting bankers
into the management. When there is
a problem, the minority banks look
at the main bank and say, “Listen,
you just about ran the company. 
You took all this responsibility. 
The company went down under 
your watch; why should we take 
the same loss that you take?” 
Eight out-of-court deals were done 
in Japan, and then the system broke
down because the main banks could
not absorb that loss of the minority
banks any more. One of the driving
forces in creating the IRCJ was that
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Bank. Old Chinon remained a public
company, controlled by Kodak. 
It was now viable because it had a
substantially reduced expense base
and a decent revenue stream from
producing lenses and digital camera
prototypes for its major shareholder,
Kodak. Some debt was allowed to
stay with the old Chinon. It was
about 35 percent of the original
Chinon debt, but it was enough to
keep Hachijuni happy. Ultimately,
that debt was paid off by the old
Chinon, under Kodak’s stewardship.
As part of the negotiations, Kodak
had agreed not to tender for the
remaining old Chinon shares for 
a period of time. In this way,
Hachijuni saved face that Chinon
remained, at least in part and for
some decent time period, a public
company on the TSE. At the end 
of two years, Kodak successfully 
tendered for the remaining shares,
took the company private, and
changed the name to Kodak. Kodak
has now shifted their entire global
digital camera business to Japan,
which is resident in the rump of 
old Chinon. 
There is a moral to this story.
Restructuring in Japan does happen,
but one must be prepared to deal
with issues that do not necessarily
arise in the United States. Issues of
face, decision-making, and timing
can take on a different hue in Japan.
At the end of the day, Hachijuni Bank
ended up writing off about three-
quarters of their debt, but they saved
face. To them, it was important that
Chinon continue as a public company
even though Kodak had control. This
required much painstaking negotia-
tion, but it was important to Hachijuni
and thus critical to the deal. 
For its part, Kodak manifested tremen-
dous patience and cultural sensitivity.
Two years down the road, it achieved
its goal, a foothold inside the Japanese
camera industry from which to launch
a digital camera initiative. 
As for the Chinon manufacturing
assets spun off into new Chinon, the
game plan was to become a contract
manufacturer. But, as with many small
manufacturers in the Japanese heart-
land, the company fell victim to
Chinese competition. Even Kodak
sought to manufacture its digital 
cameras in China. 
Ultimately the manufacturing assets
of the old Chinon were sold off piece-
meal. I suspect most of the people
involved in that business were either
laid off or scrambled for other jobs. 
Another lesson from this experience
is that you need relationships in this
business, more so than in the United
States. One does not walk in as an
investment banker, without an out-
going relationship, and say, “Hi, I’m
here to restructure your company.”
You will not get anywhere. You have
to know the main bank involved and
you have to know the company well.
If you do not know the company
well, you absolutely need to know
the main bank; otherwise you are 
not going to get to first base. 
Frankly, if we knew this deal was
going to take us the better part of
two years to close, we would have
tripled the fees on Kodak, but
Kodak’s treasurer had the last laugh
because he made me cap the fees. 
I thought we could move it along
faster. 
A final lesson is to reemphasize that
the bank has as much if not more
say about its corporate client than the
corporate client itself. That is a truism
in Japan, especially when dealing
with middle-market companies. If
you think you are negotiating with
the corporate entity and you have
not taken time to do your nemawashii,
your preparatory sort of ground 
laying with the main bank, you are
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Q: What is the role of the private
sector? What factors are influencing
the market for corporate control?
William Seidman: Some of the
banks have disposed of a very 
large part of non-performing assets
through negotiations with the private
sector. The banks have dealt with the
private sector. What they have not
been able to deal with is these major
industries with high employment
where the losses would be huge. 
In that area, there has been very 
little movement. 
Richard Gitlin: It is interesting to
watch who is raising money to play
in this game now in Japan. As of a
year ago, it was all U.S. money. It
was Cerberus, it was Lone Star, it was
Goldman, etc. The players went in
early a few years ago, bought assets
for eight cents, sold assets for twelve
cents, made early money, and now
they are in the game for private 
equity; that has been the switch. 
What has happened in the last
month? Mitsui Capital announced 
a billion dollar fund being raised 
to invest in troubled companies.
Sumitomo-Mitsui is finalizing its deal
with Goldman in a serious effort to
play in the restructuring business.
JAFCO has announced a 1.4 billion
dollar fund-raising. Institutional
Japanese investors, who, six months
ago, put little money into this busi-
ness with few exceptions, now have
a growing appetite to find places to
put their money. People anticipate
that there will be profits made and
companies will now be restructured,
and the Japanese community is now
positioning for that.
Hugh Patrick (R. D. Calkins Professor
of International Business Emeritus;
Director, Center on Japanese Economy
and Business) :
There is, as of yet, no market for cor-
porate control. Once that happens,
there probably will be a number of
cases, but until we have our first 
successful hostile takeover, we are
going to see continued negotiations.
I would like to ask, in response 
to “Does the IRCJ matter?” Are we
paying too much attention, looking 
at this government institution that is
doing very little, or is it being a goad
for accelerating the process of private
deals that are being done? If all the
action is really in the market, that is
to say that Japanese banks are nego-
tiating with foreign investment banks
to put together a subsidiary to handle
workouts in their portfolio, perhaps
even invest in others, maybe we are
misguided in paying too much atten-
tion to the IRCJ. Perhaps we should
really be looking at all these other
deals in which loans have been
restructured because when a bank
sells off a portfolio of non-performing
loans, it is realizing its value because
that is a market transaction. Maybe
the market is doing a little better job
than we realize.
Richard Gitlin: Clearly, too much
emphasis is placed on whether the
IRCJ is successful or not successful.
The IRCJ will find its place in how it
fits into Japan’s restructuring. It will
not be the ultimate answer, but it 
will find its place. In three out of
their first four cases, they handled
the government claim. I believe they 
will evolve quite well to buy out 
the minority banks that are a major
problem in dealing with Japanese
restructurings, and they will play a
significant role in doing that. 
To me, the creation of the IRCJ was
in part a stimulus for the banks to set
up their own organizations, and it
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they were to buy out the minority
banks and take that equation out of
the negotiations. 
The IRCJ could have all the business
in the world today. They could have
every bank sending them every case.
All they had to do was value it
according to the reserves of the
banks. They concluded their role was
to help drive the system down to fair
market value. Will that continue or
will they be compromised? 
Curtis is right about the law. When
you have a system of financing small
and medium businesses based on
guarantees and collateral, what hap-
pens? It has no relationship to the
ability to produce cash flow. Of
course, you are going to have prob-
lems if the economy turns. There are
no fundamentals in the lending. The
FSA has recognized that. The FSA has
issued a policy statement to change
the method of financing small and
medium businesses in Japan. It is
leading the effort to change the law
in Japan to improve inventory and
receivable financing and to change
the way small and medium enterprise
(SME) lending is done in Japan. 
Is the value really squeezed out 
of Japanese companies? Are we 
just dealing with pieces here? The
answer is no. Nissan is not a one off.
Nissan’s value went up 300 percent
after different management came in.
What happened in Japan is that it
had undisciplined capital. It had capi-
tal that was not related to discipline,
and when you have undisciplined
capital, you get undisciplined man-
agement. If a good businessperson
walks into a Japanese company
today with a decent product, they
can improve the profitability very 
significantly, and, if they add some
marketing and finance, they can
improve it more.
Within Japan’s system there are many
companies which, with the discipline
of management imposed, have the
opportunity to have much better 
performance. 
William Seidman: Restructuring,
whether it is in Europe or the Far
East, is merely a discussion of who 
is going to take the losses. There are
huge losses. The banks have made
bad loans for whatever reasons, and
in the end, you have to decide who
is going to take those losses—the
shareholders and the borrower, or
the shareholders and the bank, or the
government. If you cannot decide
that, then you are not going to be
able to move ahead with restructuring.
The battle over fair market value in
Japan is not because people do not
know what the fair market value is;
that determines who is going to take
the loss. As Richard has just said, 
you set the fair market value nice
and high so that the bank will give
you the assets; then the restructuring
group will take the loss. The restruc-
turing group has one very good prin-
ciple, which is they will not finance
any restructuring without new private
capital being part of it, so that they
have an indicator out there that what
they are doing is not just for govern-
ment purposes. In the end, Japan is
still struggling with who is going to
take the losses, and until they get
that decided, all the nice things that
we have heard about will not result
in a lot of action.
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Restructuring, whether it is
in Europe or the Far East, is
merely a discussion of who
is going to take the losses.
—William Seidman
Clearly, too much emphasis
is placed on whether the 
IRCJ is successful or not 
successful. The IRCJ will find
its place in how it fits into
Japan’s restructuring. It will
not be the ultimate answer,
but it will find its place.
—Richard Gitlin
for optimism, the major banks have
raised major capital, many from 
foreign capital. Eventually, that will
float all ships up. I am optimistic that
Japan’s economy is restructuring, 
particularly that 70 percent of that is
in the low-productivity area.
Robert Fallon: While we all talk
about the law, more restructuring is
taking place within companies than
anybody realizes. What is even more
significant is that if you take a hard
look at the companies you just men-
tioned that had increased perform-
ance because of their restructuring,
there is a lot more that could be
done. You get a sense of the power
of fixing Japan when you consider
some of these success stories. They
are not finished yet. You could look
at any one of those companies with
a fresh set of eyes and find ten steps
you could take to improve profitability. 
Hugh Patrick: I think it is important
to talk about restructuring in its
broader context because a lot has
occurred. I remind you of the 
title of this particular symposium,
“Restructuring Distressed Companies
in Japan.” That is why there has been
the focus on this most difficult area,
because of the economic and political
difficulty of deciding who is going to
have to take the losses. The losses
are there in reality; it is just that they
have not been realized in some formal
sense. Who is going to take what
portion of the loss is what this dilemma
is all about, as Bill has pointed out
so strongly.
Q: What does Japan want out of this
restructuring exercise? 
Robert Fallon: The problem with
Japan’s decade of deflation is that 
the banking sector was not healthy.
Banks are a quasi-utility. They are
intermediaries between those that
have money and those that need
money. If the banks are broken, it is
very hard to get capital circulating
and engender an economic recovery.
The more the banks propped up the
zombies, trying to delay having to
deal with the problem, the more they
exacerbated the deflationary spiral.
It is the banks that have to be fixed 
to sustain an economic recovery.
Fixing the banks means you have 
to clean up the non-performing 
loans and recap the banks—perhaps
change their management as well.
You cannot do that cleanup unless
you attack the underlying problem,
which is that borrowers are not paying
on the loans. 
The first wave of American firms
seeking to clean up the Japanese
banks included Cerberus, Lone Star,
Goldman Sachs, and Lehman. These
firms had distressed loan expertise
and set up distressed loan trading
operations in Japan around 1997 
in order to buy portfolios of non-
performing loans. They first bought
from Long Term Credit Bank, Nippon
Credit Bank, Hokkaido Takeshoku,
and Tokyo Sowa Bank, the banks
that were basically busted because
there was no alternative to raise capi-
tal. They were insolvent beyond the
denial stage. The American distressed
debt specialists set up servicing oper-
ations where, bit by bit, loan by loan,
they sent out collection people, fore-
closed on collateral, negotiated with
borrowers such as small- to medium-
sized manufacturers and entrepreneurs,
and ultimately realized liquidity from
these distressed loans in excess of
the price they paid. So they earned a
nice profit. Things started to clear in
the system. 
Now, the Japanese themselves have
restructuring teams, and they are
going out beyond their own keiretsu
because they see opportunities here.
The market is finally beginning to
clear the non-performing loan portfolio.
At the end of the day, what does
Japan want? To fix its banking sector.
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will play its role, but in the end, the
market will fix Japan. The government
will stimulate, will use the IRCJ, will 
do other things, but eventually the
market will fix Japan. Looking at 
the IRCJ and making a judgment as
to where it is, and using that as a
judgment to where restructuring is 
in Japan, is probably too narrow. 
Curtis Milhaupt: I think you could
have improved the ability of the IRCJ
if they had the right to go into a
bank and say, “We will take over this
particular credit on your behalf and
we’ll work it out our way. The banks
have no say in it.” This is very much
the way the RTC in the United States
was set up. I could not imagine how
the RTC would have succeeded if it
had to voluntarily wait for the S&Ls
to come and say, “Gee, we’ve got
some busted property deals.” 
William Seidman: We decided in
the United States who was going to
take the loss. Once you get that, all
the rest of this is machinery. You
have to get a decision on who is
going to determine who is going to
take the loss. In the United States we
had that absolute power, and we had
the power to look at an enterprise
and say, “This one is dead, liquidate
it. This one has potential, we’ll see 
if we can restructure it.” That is what
is missing.
Q: Look at the TSE-1, the 1,500
largest companies, ex-financials in
Japan. Over the last five years, the
operating margins in these compa-
nies have more than doubled; they
are generating record free cash flow.
They are reducing head count; there
is no longer lifetime employment—
it may be expensive, you may have
to call it voluntary retirement, but
they can reduce head count. They
are moving production offshore.
They are focusing their business for
selling non-core assets, and they are
being helped by industry consolida-
tion. If you look at the steel sector,
there used to be six blast furnace
makers three years ago; now there
are effectively two. I can name ten
industries where there is similar
improvement in industry structure.
Will this corporate improvement impact
in any way the distressed end of the
market that you all are addressing?
William Seidman: There are two
Japans: there is the export Japan,
which has always been highly effi-
cient, subject to extreme competition,
and not a part of this problem. This
problem is almost solely the domestic
economy, where they have had a
noncompetitive, government-regulated
industry, and that is about 70 percent
of the whole economy. If you look 
at productivity figures, Japan in the
export area is number one or two in
the world. If you look at domestic
economy productivity, they are number
thirty or thirty-five. That is the part
that is now being restructured and 
I think that is very optimistic. I am
also optimistic about where the
Japanese economy is going. When
that happens, it will certainly help
this problem. If you want to look 
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I think China is the reason that Japan is now changing. There is a new export force
in the world that can put Japan in real trouble.                    —William Seidman
William Seidman
is looked upon as giving money to
rich bankers. This was created by 
the mishandling of the Jusen crisis of
1995. Politically it is very dangerous
to inject government funds to perpet-
uate this “rich lifestyle of bankers” in
the common perception. The positive
thing about the Resona case is that it
provides a new model, a new legiti-
mation of having Government capital
injection.
That is not, however, the only per-
verse incentive structure. Banks are
not subject to any sort of external
corporate governance. The only gov-
ernance comes from the regulators.
Stockholders are passive, and the 
big problem for the banks from the
viewpoint of the people who run the
banks, namely the management, is
that if things get to a severe point,
they lose their jobs. Why should 
they do something that is dramatic 
to change things? Management has 
a disincentive to make dramatic
change. That was shown by the
Resona case, where management 
was replaced, but only at the point 
at which the bank was insolvent or
near insolvent. 
From the viewpoint of the regulators,
there are no incentives to make dra-
matic changes either. They want to
go slowly because to make dramatic
changes on one hand raises eyebrows
in the Diet and with the politicians,
and on the other hand, it is an
admission that they made mistakes 
in the past, and no regulator or any-
body else wants to admit past mis-
takes. This perverse set of incentives
makes it very difficult to carry these
things through. The point is, when is
denial overcome by reality? It looks
like, in the Japanese case, you have
to get much closer to bankruptcy
than you do in the American case.
That is the Nissan case and the
Resona case, and that means that 
a lot more of the value of the 
company is extinguished in this
process of waiting until you get 
close to bankruptcy before really
tackling it in a major way.
Robert Fallon: I would not say that
is the case with all Japanese compa-
nies. If you look at Sony, Sony made
a tactical error in terms of letting 
its overhead expand in line with
Playstation 2 revenues that really
took off over the last five years.
Once that growth cooled off, Sony
was left with bloated expenses. They
also relied for too long on conven-
tional television sets and let competi-
tors, particularly Samsung, get the
jump on flat LCD screens. But this
has not escaped them—they have
come out and said they would lay off
twenty thousand people, shut down
television manufacturing in Japan,
and export the manufacturing to
China as well as seek joint ventures
to ramp up flat panel screens. 
This certainly never would have hap-
pened in the public domain the way
that it has happened in the past few
months for Sony, where the company
is publicly contrite about its perform-
ance and promotes a restructuring
plan that is quite credible. Ten years
ago, poor performance would have
been smoothed over.
William Seidman: That is in the
export economy. They cannot afford
not to be competitive there. I think
that part of the economy in Japan,
which is about 30 percent, has
always reacted or they are out of
business. It does not matter if the
government is involved. They are
competing in the world marketplace,
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If you put healthy banks in the 
picture, as opposed to the four or
five now that are struggling along,
the economy, given productivity
enhancements undertaken by manu-
facturers, particularly in the export
sector, will be hard to stop.
Richard Gitlin: You can no longer
give one answer to what the
Japanese want. I think there are two
different views that are competing
and have been for the last five or six
years. One group wants to retain the
status quo. It benefits from the incen-
tive system that is set up and wants
to retain the social safety net.
Another group embraces the market,
wants to see assets move to their
most efficient uses, and wants a dif-
ferent set of incentive structures to
be put in place. The reason we are
not seeing people agreeing on fair
market value is that this question and
many other questions are wrapped
up in that fundamental difference of
views about how incentive structures
should be set up and whether or not
they should change in Japan. The
same struggle is going on in corpo-
rate governance: there are those
firms that endorse dramatic restruc-
turing and embracing capital markets
and so on, and then there is a large
group of firms that are continuing to
play by the old set of rules. I do not
think we are going to see dramatic
changes until that struggle is com-
pletely played out.
A senior LDP official once asked,
“What other country could go through
nine years of absolute financial bubble
crisis and still have social stability?” It
was not easy to achieve that, he said.
“That’s the LDP’s objective. You want
us to turn our socialist economy into
a market economy. We don’t want 
to do that because we are trying to
keep people a little more equal in
their income, but equal in their bene-
fits. Every answer you give us that
says, ‘you must do this to fix your
banking system’ is going to drive a
wedge in Japan’s social structure. 
We senior members of the LDP feel
we have a higher obligation than the
economics, which is to preserve the
social system.”
What he did not recognize is failure
to address the economic problems
truly after nine years thoroughly prej-
udiced the social system. Koizumi
recognizes that. I think, fundamentally,
the goal in Japan is to preserve what
is a very special system and relation-
ship among people in Japan, and 
to try to fix the economy consistent
with that. The power structure is 
trying to figure out who does what 
in order to make this happen.
Hugh Patrick: Most Japanese are
troubled about the current conditions,
but they do not feel they are in a 
crisis. After all, incomes have not
gone down. GDP has grown, per
capita incomes have increased, and
so there has not been a crisis. There
has been a hidden crisis, which is the
crisis of the young generation who
are not getting good jobs that give
them the on-the-job training that is
important for the future. The real 
sacrifice is being made by young
people, and that is a very unfortu-
nate, hidden dilemma over the
longer run. Gradually, people will
come to realize that. 
The LDP senior executives talk about
social stability and so forth, and 
that is true. They also realize that 
any LDP or other politician who
votes to give money to the banks 
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Most Japanese are troubled
about the current conditions,
but they do not feel they are
in a crisis.
—Hugh Patrick
It is amazing to me with all
the things that have been
going on that only a couple
of banks fired their man-
agers (unless they went
Western).
—William Seidman
going on that only a couple of banks
fired their managers (unless they
went Western). I think Japan has a
long way to go yet. They have the
people, but the people on top have
not gotten out of the way.
Curtis Milhaupt: One bright spot 
is the accounting profession, which
has improved. The Resona crisis was
triggered by a more stringent set of
accounting practices being put into
place. There is a lot of evidence that
the accounting profession’s examina-
tion of banks has improved. A less
positive aspect of the Resona restruc-
turing is that ultimately the share-
holders were left standing, so you
still have a big moral hazard problem
inherent in the system. 
Richard Gitlin: Governor Fukui’s
speech of November 4 clearly articu-
lates for the first time in a public
speech what he thinks banks should
be doing in the future in Japan. What
he says is they should be generating
credit, and they certainly have to
improve their quality in generating
the credit, and then that credit should
be turned over to the market. He
explains the first level market and the
secondary market that he believes
has to develop. He calls it the seam-
less credit society. Some of Japan’s
leaders are clearly focused on what
should happen, but as Bill said, you
cannot achieve this without manage-
ment that is capable of achieving it.
Hugh Patrick: The point that you
have to price credit according to risk
is key. So far, that has not happened.
Part of the problem is that you are 
in a deflationary environment, and 
so you have some macro constraints.
You need to stop deflation and
reduce that pressure on the banks.
Fundamentally, the banks are going
to have to save themselves by focus-
ing on becoming profitable once
again. They have to have conditions
under which they can do that, but
then they have to take advantage of
the opportunities, and the question is
whether the signals and incentives
are going to be such that they really
will price risk appropriately. That
does not seem to be happening yet.
Q: Two questions: first, in the United
States, the price for failure is liquida-
tion. Do you have that price of 
failure in Japan? Second, if you have
a deflationary environment with a
recession so that many firms fail,
aren’t banks going to be in trouble 
in Japan, even if they are pricing
credit rationally?
Richard Gitlin: The banks have more
power over their borrowers in Japan
than do the U.S. banks in the United
States. If the main bank wants its
company to go under, that company
is going to go under. It has nothing
to do with the right to secure collat-
eral. Companies are generally
dependent on their main bank for
survival. If the system were such that
the main banks could recognize the
true value of their credit, the main
banks have people that are quite
capable of dealing with their problems.
Alternative Investments Report Restructuring Distressed Companies in Japan 21
and if they do not compete, they
are out.
I think China is the reason that Japan
is now changing. There is a new
export force in the world that can
put Japan in real trouble. I think the
Japanese are awakening to the fact
that the old ball game is over, and
there has to be a new Japan that
takes into account the huge competi-
tor right on their doorstep. 
Q: What are the political implications
of reform?
Richard Gitlin: I have to endorse
what Bill said earlier; I think Koizumi
has been brilliant in how he has
managed to maneuver in his position
and maintain power and keep a reform
process going. It was remarkable that
he kept Takenaka in government.
Some of the senior LDP wanted
Takenaka gone and he kept him. It 
is clear that progress is being made
and the people who fought reform
are losing, and that is very good for
Japan. Slowly, Koizumi is driving a
stake into that old philosophy of the
LDP and changing it.
Q: To what extent does the relative
lack of exit strategies hinder some of
the distressed investing and restruc-
turing? Have there been favorable
developments in this area?
Robert Fallon: The lack of exit
strategies has affected people’s
enthusiasm about doing private 
equity in Japan. But the immediate
problem is a shortage of deals. Right
now, there is plenty of private capital
available but too few opportunities to
invest. Some of this is due to innate
Japanese conservatism about the via-
bility of private equity, but some is
also due to factors I mentioned earlier,
such as a lack of cultural savoir faire
or ability to deal through or with the
main banks.
On the other hand, the government
has raised the subject of exit vehicles
because they recognize at some point
that this process is going to work.
That is at a very rudimentary stage,
but it is on the agenda in Japan.
Hugh Patrick: One way of exiting is
by an IPO. The IPO market is actually
quite active right now in Japan, mostly
with new, small companies. You
could argue that the private equity
deals that have been done so far
have not had a long enough time for
gestation; it takes five to seven years
perhaps. I think we will see the
Shinsei Bank ownership shift either
by an IPO early next year as is
planned or possibly a direct sale. 
We will start seeing some exits, but 
it is too early to worry about that.
The market is going to be there, so
that if you have a good company
and you want to make an IPO for it,
you probably will be relatively suc-
cessful. I think IPOs have occurred
more in Japan in the last six months
than they have in the United States. 
Q: Is enough being done with the
banking structure to prevent these
sort of NPLs from happening again?
Richard Gitlin: That is a good ques-
tion. You would like to believe that
the banks have learned their lesson
and that as the economy recovers,
they will price their capital on a risk-
adjusted basis. The Japanese bankers,
whom I have talked to, talk that talk,
but I am concerned some pricing
may not meet this standard. They
have been warned that if they get
back into that same old competitive
mode of buying market share at the
expense of a legitimate return on
their capital, that they are going to
be back in the same problem ten or
fifteen years from now. 
William Seidman: If you look at
Japanese banking today, there is not
new, young leadership in the bank-
ing system. They are going to have
to move into the next generation of
banking leaders. It is amazing to me
with all the things that have been
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The viewpoint of the people who run the banks, namely the management,
is that if things get to a severe point, they lose their jobs. Why should they
do something that is dramatic to change things? Management has a 
disincentive to make dramatic change. —Hugh Patrick
Hugh Patrick
departments that treat themselves as
separate companies. Within the gov-
ernment, there are bureaucracies that
treat themselves as separate govern-
ments. One of the real handicaps 
in fixing Japan is how you get the
pieces to work together. Within each
of the ministries, within FSA, within
the banks, the industries, there is a
level of remarkably capable people
who are just sitting there with many
of the answers for Japan and a desire
to make it happen. Leadership is not
tying them together and you cannot
get a solution to this complex prob-
lem without linkage. The one thing I
would recommend to Prime Minister
Koizumi is to focus on linkage.
Robert Fallon: My recommendation
would be to keep Takenaka-san in
power and also empower the IRCJ to
unilaterally go in and identify a cor-
poration that is non-performing and
force a restructuring or liquidation 
of that company as the case may be,
particularly in the real estate and
construction sector.
Curtis Milhaupt: I think the govern-
ment has done a good job. The insti-
tutional reforms that have taken
place in the last five years in the 
corporate area, in the banking sector,
have been very good. It is not to say
that there is not a continuing role 
for government, but this discussion
suggests that the change will come
from the private sector, from the
banks and the markets. The structure
is in place for that to happen, and
people need to change their mindset
and start making use of the machinery.
I do not see a big role for the gov-
ernment other than this leadership
factor.
Hugh Patrick: The government
should inject capital into all the major
banks and some of the less major
banks sufficiently that the banks will
be able to really write off their bad
loans and then be able to go about
their business of becoming profitable
credit-allocating enterprises. The
problem is that the banks do not
have enough capital now to write off
as many loans as they really would
like to write off, and that is particu-
larly the problem with the very big
companies. Most of the restructuring
talk centers around the mid-size 
and smaller companies; it is the big
zombies that are a huge dilemma. 
If I were able to suggest one policy,
I would say, “Be bold! Inject the 
government capital into the banks.” 
I say this despite the Resona problem.
Japan is full of moral hazard, so one
more does not bother me. The dilemma
is to make the banks strong enough
so that they can write off the bad
stuff and then go about becoming
real banks. 
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A lot of companies go bankrupt in
Japan; there are many liquidations 
of companies in Japan. Usually a
sponsor comes in and takes over, 
but they are basically liquidations.
Sometimes they are just sold in
pieces. The failure of the system 
is the failure of the government to
properly correct the banks in the 
way they deal with their reserves 
and decide who should take the loss
early in the game, and get on with it.
Robert Fallon: If the banks had
priced credit rationally, the asset 
bubble never would have occurred
because the bubble was largely
directed toward real estate compa-
nies, and that is one of the riskiest
sectors of lending. In retrospect, 
you wonder how it could have 
happened. Everyone in Japan was
involved. I was a banker in Japan
and I was involved. Everybody was
getting rich. The nice thing about a
bubble is that you do not know you
are in it until it is over.
If the banks had priced credit cor-
rectly, the bubble would have had
some self-correction to dampen the
speculative inflation in prices. That 
is not to say that some firms would
not have gone bankrupt. They may
well have, but at least there would
have been some liquidity to clear 
the distressed assets and get through 
the property correction in a few
years as opposed to a decade.
Willliam Seidman: We had a beauti-
ful bubble in our banking system,
and we are just seeing how much
corruption came out of that bubble
in every major industry, even the
mutual funds, all as a result of that
bubble! I want to make sure that our
Japanese friends know I am very
humble about saying the United States
knows the answer to all of this.
Q: What would your advice be to Prime
Minister Koizumi or Takenaka-san?
William Seidman: Koizumi, in gen-
eral, is doing exactly what he ought
to be doing. The Japanese know
what the problem is; what they need
is the courage or the political power
to take care of that problem.
Richard Gitlin: Japan is the most
vertical society I have ever encoun-
tered. Within companies there are
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Japan is the most vertical society I have ever encountered. Within 
companies there are departments that treat themselves as separate 
companies. Within the government, there are bureaucracies that treat 
themselves as separate governments. . . . One of the real handicaps
in fixing Japan is how you get the pieces to work together.
—Richard Gitlin
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